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ABSTRACT

Feminist social science and scholarship must create theory grounded in the actual experience and language of women. Throughout the history of social science, conceptions and theories of female sexuality, psychology, and social roles have derived from men's beliefs about women. The history of social science theory on women proves that science and science-making tend to serve and reinforce dominant social values rather than challenge them. Thus, the problem stems not only from the substance of particular theories but also from the conventions of scientific method: what is considered worthy of study and worthy of knowing, and what is not. Feminism empowers and requires women to think differently about method. Basic questions involve the posing of a meaningful problem then addressing that problem in the manner most consonant with its substance and most likely to lead to relevant answers. The early stages of feminist social science should involve removing the perceptual and conceptual lenses of traditional science and theory in order to generate new concepts. Traditionally, approaches to science have valued objective knowledge, expertise, neutrality, and separateness. These values have been opposed to subjective knowledge, understanding, art, communion, and experience. Feminist social science requires seeing things as they are: whole and complex. This type of passionate scholarship demands rigor, precision, and responsibility in the highest degree. (Author/KC)

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PASSIONATE SCHOLARSHIP

Notes on Values, Knowing and Method in Feminist Social Science

1. Science is not "value-free;" it cannot be. Science is made by scientists, and both we and our science-making are shaped by our culture. Science moves within culture, and only slowly expands the limits of its own vision. Social scientists are certainly no more able than others to pursue inquiry in the absence of the assumptions and values of their own societies. In fact, the closer our subject matter to our own life and experience, the more we can expect our own beliefs about the world to enter into and shape our work -- to influence the very questions we pose, our conception of how to approach those questions, and the interpretations we generate from our findings.

Our models of inquiry, of science-making, are also models of reality: they reflect how we conceptualize what is, what is to be known, and how it is to be known. The beliefs we hold about the nature of reality and of human beings are ways in which we organize and make meaning out of experience and information; beliefs, too, are ways of knowing. The history of science is a long history of organizing information, observation and experience. And that history contains many instances of so-called "scientific" fact or knowledge being proven later to have been little more than the dominant beliefs of the culture itself.[1]

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An example of this that is by now a small classic is Freud's theory of female sexuality[2] -- according to which there was supposedly a clitoral orgasm associated with immature female sexuality, and a "mature" orgasm, the vaginal orgasm, to which the woman was to shift with full (heterosexual) genitality. This theory held sway over the minds of psychoanalysts and women for years. It was only relatively recently proven fals by the work of Masters and Johnson,[3] who finally demonstarted, of course, that in a woman as in a man, an orgasm is an orgasm in an orgasm (though infinitely delighful in variety), and that for women they all involve the supposedly "immature" clitoris -- which turns out to be not only the primary erogenous organ in women but, according to Mary Jane Sherfey, also the embryonic precursor, not the vestige, of the penis.[4] The point, of course, is that what we have long had throughout social science have been conceptions and theories of female sexuality, psychology and social roles that essentially derive, not from the experience of women, but from the minds of men that their beliefs about women. (Hardly disinterested beliefs, either: for whom was it most convenient to suppose that women's sexual role and satisfaction depended uniquely upon the penis?)

This example is particularly poignant, but it is by no means an isolated one. Science and science-making tend to serve and reinforce dominant social values and conceptions of reality -- as mush as and often more than they serve to challenge them; the history of social science theory on women is a history of this phenomenon. And the science-making that is in fact based in different values than those prevailing in the culture at a given time, and that thus attempts to discover, explore and explain different realities, tends to be ignored -- or attacked as "unscientific." This judgement can frequently be understood for what it really is: not in fact a judgement about science, but a charge of heresy.

II. The "power" of an equation, formula or theory lies in its ability to explain, to accout fully for the phenomenon being studied. In this sense, the power of social science theory about women has been and is still very low indeed. As psychologist Naomi Weisstein bluntly put it several years ago, psychology has very little to tell us about what women are really like.[5] And that's many years after Freud said his last words on the subject -- which were, essentially, that femininity was still a

"riddle," and that we'd probably do best to turn to the poets for the answers![6] (And I don't think he meant women poets.)

We have yet no psychology of women, no sociology of women, no anthropology of women, no real history of women, no thorough and coherent social science theory about women. Through feminist scholorship we are now beginning to learn about women and women's lives in all these areas. But in all these fields of social science -- and in at least some of the humanities, such as art history -- what we have had up to now is theory that purports to treat of human beings, of people -- but theory that is in fact grounded in, derived from, based on and reinforcing of the experience, perceptions and beliefs of men. The male perspective throughout all our disciplines is over-riding, and, until very recently, with the beginnings of feminist scholarship, unquestioned, axiomatic. Even when it has been women who have been studied (and in psychology, at least, unlike some of the social sciences, women have been very much studied!), the perspective and the modes of study have remained masculine, those of the dominant culture -- with all its myths and beliefs and prescriptions about who women are, who and what women should be; and with all its apparent inability or unwillingness to listen to women say what we really experience, what we really see, who we really are. (The persistence of the Psychoanalytic notion of the "double orgasm" is a painful example: If the actual experience of women were in any way the base for theory-making about women, that myth would have gone by long ago. Women have been speaking the truth of their experience to their therapists, at least, four years -- for in many cases they went to those therapists because they couldn't get themselves to do or be what the theories said they shoud.)

The androcentric or phallocentric fallacy about women in virtually all of social science has been this: The "person" has been considered to be male, and the female, the woman, has been defined in terms, not of what she is, but of what she is not. Woman has been defined as "not-a-man." And things female have tended to be seen -- in sociology, anthropology, history, as well as in psychology -- as deviations, anomalies.

The questions a science poses, though they strive toward the unknown, must always refer to, be based in, the known. When distorted conceptions of reality are the ground of science, distorted perceptions of reality will

be the fruits of science. The androcentric perspective in social science has rendered women not only unknown, but virtually unknowable.

III. I emphasize that this has to do not only with the substance of particular theories, but with the very conventions of science-making. It has to do with what is considered worthy of study, worth knowing, and what is not, and with how it is studied, how it is known.

For all that we may talk about "a" scientific method (and by this is most often meant the experimental method that obtains in some of the physical sciences), there are in fact a number of methods and several different phases of science-making -- and methods differ, or should, according to the question at issue, the development of knowledge in that area, and the phase of science-making involved.

The different phases of science-making involve the posing of the problem or question, then observation, naming, description, explanation, and eventually, in some fields, prediction and control of the phenomena under study (though I am convinced that we leave the domain of science altogether when we start talking about "control" of human beings). These "phases" are of course not strictly linear in relationship, but rather circular, interactive, and reflexive. They constitute a process. To some extent (especially in qualitative researcy) they can and do proceed together.[8] The values and epistemology of the researcher inform each phase of the process, and, contrary to general ideas of strict scientific neutrality, the process of science-making in fact involves interpretation, theory-making, and thus values, in each of its phases. "Naming" is probably the first order of interpretation in science -- the naming of the question, the naming of one's observations, and so on -- and naming, the capacity to name what we see, is, as a matter of language, inherently expressive of culture.

In science as in society, the power of naming is at least twofold: Naming defines the quality and value of that which is named -- and it also denies reality and value to that which is never named, never uttered. That which has no name, that for which we have no words or concepts, is rendered mute and invisible; powerless to inform or transform our consciousness of our experience, our understanding, our vision; powerless to claim its own existence.

This has been the situation of women in our world. And this silence, this invisibility, has been confirmed and perpetuated by the ways in which social science has looked at -- and not seen -- women. But in this silence and invisibility is to be found the reality of women, of our lives, our experience, our vision -- and the potential for new understandings and constructions of ourselves and our world. To address women's lives and experience in their own terms, to create theory grounded in the actual experience and language of women, is the central agenda for feminist social science and scholarship.

For this endeavor we need, we require, woman-centered scholarship. The goal, of course, in all the fields of science, is ultimately to be able to see, described and understand the world and human experience in universal terms. But what has so far been called "universal" in vision and knowledge has in fact been a science and scholarship of men -- and the knowledge it has produced is seriously, fundamentally flawed for that very reason.[9] Any "universal" understanding of human beings and human society that leaves women out and, when it brings us in, renders us unknowable even to ourselves, is not only inaccurate out mystifying, damaging. Science and scholarship that make visible the experience of women, and that "reinterpret knowledge in terms of that experience," is, an Adrienne Rich says, "the most important task of thinking."[10]

Yet, simply changing the focus of inquiry and study to women is not likely to reveal us to ourselves any more clearly if we are using the same old lenses to look through.[11] The agenda and the conventions of our science-making are as important a focus for our scrutiny and creativity as is the actual substance of our inquiry.[12]

IV. What I'd like to be able to do now, of course, would be to propose some radical new method for feminist social science. But I do not in fact hold that there is our ought to be a distinctively feminist scientific method. I do believe that feminism empowers and requires us to think very differently about method than we have been able to do within the confines and hegemony of androcentric science and worldview. What is generally considered scientific in social science inquiry reflects, expresses and therefore perpetuates patriarchal conceptions and values about the world in both purposes and methods. Thus feminist social science and scholarship offer

the possibility of necessary, vital and vitalizing departures from the norms and functions, both scientific and political, of traditional social science.

The persistent debate over the scientific value of qualitative versus quantitative methods in social science actually obscures some basic questions that need to be raised in conjuction with all inquiry. If the starting point in science-making is the posing of a meaningful problem or question, then what is scientific in method is to address that question in the manner and terms most consonant with its substance, and most likely to lead to relevant "answers." The first criterion involves philosophical and epistemological issues, the second primarily methodological considerations. Further, at different stages in the development of knowledge in a given area, the purposes of inquiry -- and therefore its methods -- will properly differ. At one point it will be necessary and appropriate to identify and describe pheonomena; then to generate concepts, propositions, hypotheses; at another stage, to refine these, test them, relate them to findings in different areas, and so on. What is scientific at one stage not necessarily be so at another.

I see feminist social science and scholarship as being at the earliest stages of science-making about women. Across all the disciplines of social science and many of the humanities, feminist scholars are engaged in almost an archaeological endeavor -- that of discovering, uncovering, recovering the actual facts of women's lives and experience, facts that have been hidden, inaccessible, suppressed, distorted, misunderstood, ignored. This is the early work of observation, naming and description that prepares the ground for theory-making. And in this early work we must first, quite literally, learn to <u>see</u>. To see what is <u>there</u>; not what we've been taught is there, not even what we might wish to find, but what <u>is</u>. We literally <u>cannot see women</u> through traditional science and theory.[13] Learning to do so is no simple task; it is not simple even for feminists. The distorting perceptual and conceptual lenses of patriarchy are the lenses we have all been taught to look through; removing them is slow, sometimes painful and frightening as it opens our eyes to reality-without-explanation; and it is invariably startling. It is also a <u>communal</u>, not an individual, task.[14]

As each one of us removes those lenses and is able to say what she sees, the world opens up for all of us: things can begin to make sense. And our description of what we see needs to be careful, detailed, rigorous. It is here that we make visible the realities of our experience, here that we begin to elucidate the inherent patterns of significance that can lead to the making of truly "grounded theory" about women.[15]

We are also at the stage where our work needs to be conceptually oriented, directed to the generation of concepts.[16] The languages and theories we have to work with still lack the very concepts by which the experience and reality of women's lives can be named, described and understood. Our work needs to generate words, concepts, that refer to, that spring from, that are firmly and richly grounded in the actual experiencing of women.

In learning to see, name and describe the experience and realities of women, we learn to see and conceptualize contextually, complexly. We must become not only accepting of but eager for the increasing complexity that we discover as we look at ourselves and our world.[17] To be open to this increasing complexity and to contextuality means to move out of the realms of discourse and logic that rely on linear and static conceptions of reality, on dualistic models of human nature and intercourse, on dichotomous modes of thought, discourse and analysis.

Dichotomy, duality, linearity, fixity: These are not the properties of nature nor of human life and experiencing. They are the properties of a learned mode of thought, a way of seeing and knowing that casts reality into rigid, oppositional and hierarchical categories. This model of reality has shaped our conceptions of the world and of science. Scientific method is not exclusively or even primarily the method of the erector set or the method of taking things apart and putting them back together in order to understand them.[18] Our scientific methods, as women, as feminists, require seeing things as they are: whole, entire, complex. Our work requires that we see things in context, that we understand and explain our eventful, complex reality within and as a part of its matrix. It is only within its matrix that experience, reality, can be known.

And this matrix includes the knower.

V. Traditional science states that the observer and the observed, the knower and the known, are separate, that the one must not "contaminate" the other if true objectivity is to be attained. Feminist scholarship reveals a different animating assumption: that the knower and the known are of the same universe,

that they are not separable.

In its conceptions of science and knowing, our society has embraced and reified and values of objective knowledge, expertise, neutrality, separateness, and opposed them to the values of subjective knowledge, understanding, art, communion, craft and experience. The science that works on the basis of these dichotomies supports oppositional and hierarchical notions of the "natural order" and at the same time makes the statement that it is value-free science.[19] To polarize the subjective and the objective falsifies experience and reality, and the possibility of knowing them. Objectivity and subjectivity are modes of knowing, analysis, interpretation, understanding. They are not independent of each other, and should not be.

As women, we inhabit our world with a "double consciousness."[20] We are in and of our society but in important ways also not "of" it. We see and think in the terms of our culture; we have been trained to these terms, shaped to them; they have determined not only the ways in which we have been able to perceive and understand large events, but even the ways in which we have been able to perceive, structure and understand our most intimate experiencing. Yet we have always another consciousness, another potential language within us, available to us. We are aware, however inchoately, of the reality of our own perceptions and experience; we are aware that this reality has often been not only unnamed but unnameable; we understand that our invisibility and silence hold the germs of both madness and power, of both dissolution and creation...

We are observer and observed, subject and object, knower and known. When we take away the lenses of androcentrism and patriarchy, what we have left is our own eyes, ourselves, and each other. We are the instruments of observation and understanding; we are the namers, the interpreters of our lives. To try to work without this instrument and this language is to do nothing other than what most of science has tried to do: pretend to leave the self[21] and the valuing process out of science-making, and thus perpetuate the image of science as the objective observer of fixed reality, the neutral seeker after truth.

Traditional science reacts to and builds on a consensual construction of reality; that construction of reality is seen as given, fixed, real. It is to be known, from the outside, objectively, neutrally, impersonally. Feminism withdraws consent from the male-defined construction of reality. We do not accept it as given, fixed, or real. Thus feminist science-making withdraws consent from given constructions of what is to be known and how.

We reject the dichotomies between science and the maker of science, between observation and experience; we reject the idea that the task of science is to examine a given, statitic reality of which we are observers, not participants.[22] The challenge for feminist science will be to see, name, describe and explain without recreating these dichotomies, without falling into the old pattern of objectifying experience, processual reality, by withdrawing from it and ourselves to a position of assumed neutrality.[23] Our science-making, rooted in, animated by an expressive of our values, empowered by community, is passionate scholarship: necessary heresy.

There is no question that feminist scientists and scholars will continue to be charged with bias, advocacy, subjectivity, ideologizing, and so on. We can expect this; we can even welcome it. If our work is not in some way threatening to the established order, we're on the wrong track.[24]

But it is harder when we question ourselves about our own honesty, responsibility and sanity in our work. I'd be surprised if there is anyone here who is doing feminist scholarship who hasn't at some point wondered whether she were being honest and "objective" in her work, whether she weren't perhaps "making it all up," whether she were being manipulative or biased in her design, her reporting, her interpretations. I know my own work and thinking have been fraught with these questions, and will continue to be. They are natural; they express the fertile conflict between the ways we've been taught to see, know and judge reality, and the beginnings of a different cosmos of values about what reality is and how it can be known. Our doubts and uncertainties are not only natural, they are even desirable. They keep us honest, for one thing -- by obliging us continually to question our purposes, our motives, our values, our integrity, our scholarship. And they make for better science, in fact -- for what I call the "fertile conflict" our uncertainties express holds the beginnings of the synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity that is the source for truth -- and for intellectual power and responsibility.

Those who have most vividly illumined our vision of the world, whether in the natural sciences, the social sciences, the humanities or the arts, understand the meaning of what Michael Polanyi[25] calls "personal knowledge," the relationship of the knower to the known, the "passionate participation of the knower in the act of knowing." Passionate scholarship in no way means mushiness or a focus on our own navels; it demands rigor, precision and responsibility in the highest degree. And it makes possible a common endeavor of science-making that can actually engage the conjunctions among values, pur-

poseses, methods and modes of knowing -- that can begin to integrate subjectivity with objectivity, substance with process, passion with responsibility, and the knower with the known.

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NOTES

1. See, for example, Juanita Williams, Psychology of Women: Behavior in a Biosocial Context (N.Y., W.W. Norton, 1977). Describing some of the myths by which men have characterized women, Williams says, "Mostly, understandings of women have taken the form of strongly held beliefs which served to validate and to order experience, or have emanated from such authoritative sources that few would question them....Such beliefs are ways of knowing; they predate but continue to exist alongside the attempts of science to explain human behavior." (pp. 1-2) A bit later, hower, she notes also that science itself can function to codify and reinforce such belief systems: "Early 20th century Explanations of social and behavioral sex differences which rely on differences in brain size, variability between females and males on certain characteristics, such as intelligence , and the maternal instinct seem quaintly archaic to us now, but it is very easy to see how neatly these concepts met the need of behavioral scientists of a few decades ago to understand the social phenomena of their world. In attempting to move from myth to science, they created new myths which would both explain and justify the social order." (pp. 14-15)

2. See Sigmund Freud, "Femininity," New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, James Strachey, trans. and ed. (N.Y., W.W. Norton, 1933 (Freud), 1964, 1965 (Strachey)); especially p. 118. See also Sigmund Freud, "Three contributions to the theory of sex," The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, A.A. Brill, trans. and ed. (N.Y., Random House, 1938).

3. See W.H. Masters and V.E. Johnson, Human Sexual Response (Boston, Little, Brown, 1966).

4. See Mary Jane Sherfey, The Nature and Evolution of Female Sexuality (N.Y., Vintage Brooks, 1973).

5. Naomi Weisstein, "Psychology constructs the female," in Vivian Gornick and Barbara K. Moran, eds., Woman in Sexist Society: Studies in Power and Powerlessness (N.Y., Basic Books, 1971), p. 135.

6. See Sigmund Freud, "Femininity," New Introductory Lectures..., especially pp. 116, 135.

7. Among many others: In psychology, Jean Baker Miller, Psychoanalysis and Women (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1973) and Toward a New Psychology of Women (Boston, Beacon Press, 1976); Juanita H. Williams, cited in Note 1. In sociology, Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kanter, eds., Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science (Garden City, N.Y., Anchor/Doubleday, 1975); Joan Huber, ed., Changing Women in a Changing Society (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1973); Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, Toward a Sociology of Women (Lexington, Mass., Xerox College Publishing, 1972). In anthropology, Rayna R. Reiter, ed., Toward an Anthropology of Women (N.Y. and London, Monthly Review Press, 1975). In history, Gerda Lerner, The Female Experience: An American Documentary (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1977), The Woman in American History (Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1971), Black Women in White America (N.Y., Pantheon, 1972). In art and art history, Ann S. Narris and Linda Nochlin, Women Artists: 1550-1950 (N.Y., Knopf, 1976); Judy Chicago,

Through the Flower (N.Y., Doubleday, 1977); Lucy Lippard, ed., From the Center: Feminist Essays on Women's Art (N.Y., E.P. Dutton, 1976). In literature, Ellen Moers, Literary Women: The Great Writers (Garden City, N.Y., Anchor/Doubleday, 1977); Josephine Donovan, ed., Feminist Literary Criticism: Explorations in Theory (Lexington, Kentucky, University of Kentucky Press, 1975).

8. See Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, "Discovery of substantive theory: A basic strategy underlying qualitative research," in William J. Filstead, ed., Qualitative Methodology: Firsthand Involvement with the Social World (Chicago, Markham, 1970), pp. 289-290.

9. The need for woman-centered science is noted by a number of feminist scholars. Historian Gerda Lerner is discomfited by the very term "Women's History" because it is "...a misnomer. The unavailability of proper terminology is itself a mark of the difficulties we have in conceptualizing the novel and somewhat daring enterprise on which we have engaged....The term must be understood...as a conceptual model, a strategy by which to focus on and isolate that which traditional history has obscured. Once that is done, and the history of women is incoroprated in scholarship and culture, we may then speak properly of a new universal history..." (Gerda Lerner, "The challenge of women's history," lecture delivered at the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 25 August 1977) Psychoanalyst Jean Baker Miller: "Perhaps modern attempts to talk in universals have obscured the specific problems and the specific possibilities for each sex. While we would like to think in terms of basic human needs and psychological processes, the time has not yet come when we can do so without first sorting out differences." (Psychoanalysis and Women, cited in Note 7; p. 391) Anthropologist Rayna Reiter: "We need new studies that will focus on women; it cannot be otherwise because of the double bias which has trivialized and misinterpreted female roles for so long. Yet the final outcome of such an approach will be a reorientation of anthropology so that it studies humankind. Focusing first on women, we must redefine the important questions, reexamine all previous theories, and be critical in our acceptance of what constitutes factual material." (Toward an Anthropology of Women, cited in Note 7; p. 16) What is being called for is what Lerner describes as a "paradigm shift," a fundamental re-evaluation of assumptions and methodology in the traditional disiplines and traditional thought.

10. Adrienne Rich, "Foreword: Conditions for work: The common world of women," in Sara Ruddick and Pamela Daniels, eds., Working It Out (N.Y., Pantheon, 1977), p. xxiii.

11. See Rae Carlson, "Understanding women: Implications for personality theory and research," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1972), pp. 17-32.

12. For further thoughts on "feminist method" in the social sciences, see Barbara Du Bois, Feminist Perspectives on Psychotherapy and the Psychology of Women: An Exploratory Study in the Development of Clinical Theory (Doctoral Dissertation, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University, 1976; available through University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan). See especially Chapters II and V, in which I propose "eductive" method as an approach to research with and about women, and as a way of developing grounded theory about women.

13. I thank Leigh Star for helping me "see" this point.

14. Adrienne Rich speaks to the important of community in feminist work and scholarship: "...if, in trying to join the common world of men, the professions molded by a primarily masculine consciousness, we split ourselves off from the common life of women and deny our female heritage and identity in our work, we lose touch with our real powers and with the essential condition for all truly realized work: community." ("Foreword" to Ruddick and Daniels, cited in Note 10; p. xvii) And Jean Baker Miller notes that the "community of women" "...advances and fosters both attempts at knowledge and a personal conviction about the content and methods of getting at knowledge. It creates a new sense of connection between knowledge, work, and personal life." (Toward a New Psychology of Women, cited in Note 7; p. 136)

15 For more on grounded theory, see Glaser and Strauss and Filstead, both cited in Note 8.

16. See Du Bois, cited in Note 12; pp. 53-54.

17. "There is no 'the truth,' 'a truth' -- truth is not one thing, or even a system. It is an increasing complexity." (Addrienne Rich, "Women and Honor: Some Notes on Lying," Pittsburgh, Motheroot Publications/Pittsburgh Women Writers, 1977).

18. For further discussion of "agenitic" and "phallocentric" styles in and conceptions of research, see: Rae Carlson (cited in Note 11); Jessie Bernard, "My for revolutions: An autobiographical history of the ASA American Sociological Association ," in Huber (cited in Note 7); Ravenna Helson, "The changing impage of the career woman," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1972), pp. 33-46.

19. Donna Haraway discusses these issues in connection with the central concept of dominance in the animal sciences; she broadens their relevance to science more generally in this observation: "Nor must we lightly accept the damaging distinction between pure and applied science, between use ahd abuse of science, and even between nature and culture. All are versions of the philosophy of science that exploits the rupture between subject and object to justify the double ideology of firm scientific objectivity and mere personal subjectivity. This antiliberation core of knowledge and practice in our sciences is an important buttress of social control." (p. 22) (Donna Haraway, "Animal sociology and a natural economy of the body politic, Part I: A political physiology of dominance. Part II: The past is the contested zone: Human nature and theories of production and reproduction in primate behavior studies," Signs, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Autumn 1978), pp. 21-60)

20. For discussion of W.E.B. Du Bois' concept of "double consciousness" in relation of women scholars and their work, see Ruby Rohrlich-Leavitt, Barbara Sykes and Elizabeth Weatherford, "Aboriginal woman: Male and Female anthropological perspectives," in Reiter, cited in Note 7.

21. Carol Warren's comments on the self of the researcher in the research process are worth noting; see Carol A.B. Warren, "Fieldwork in the gay world: Issues in pheonomenological research," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1977),

pp. 93-107.

22. Read Note 17 again.

23. I thank Heather Wishik and Campbell Harvey for our lively and productive discussion of these aspects of feminist science.

24. Ruth Bleier notes: "No doubt, as feminist scholars reconstruct prehistory and history, as they offer their theories about biology and social behavior, they will continue to be accused of promoting their own bias. It is a pity that the sensitivity to bias comes so late." (Ruth Bleier, "Bias in biological and human sciences: Some comments," Signs, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Autumn 1978), p. 162) and Howard Becker observes that it is in fact not possible to do research with political implications "...the accusation of bias in a fellow-researcher arises, in one important class of cases, when the research gives credence, in any serious way, to the perspective of the subordinate group in some hierarchical relationship." (pp. 15-17) Becker emphasizes that "Our problem is to make sure that, whatever point of view we take, our research meets the standards of good scientific work, that our unavoidable sympathies do not render our results invalid." (p. 23) (Howard S. Becker, "Whose side are we on?", in Filstead, cited in Note 8).

25. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958).

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